Explaining the (il)legality of Uganda's intervention in the current South Sudan conflict

During the night of 15 December 2013, fighting broke out between factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Juba, the capital of the Republic of South Sudan. The fighting pitted forces loyal to President Salva Kiir against those loyal to former Vice President Riek Machar. Five days later, Uganda sent troops into South Sudan, advancing a number of reasons for intervention, including that it had been invited by the legitimate government of South Sudan to ensure order; it needed to evacuate Ugandan citizens caught up in the fighting; it had been asked by the United Nations Secretary-General to intervene; and that the regional organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development had sanctioned the intervention. As the conflict escalated, Ugandan troops started fighting on the side of forces loyal to Kiir. The underlying reasons for the intervention were clearly economic, but those advanced were legal. This article discusses both sets of reasons and concludes that the economic reasons are more persuasive. Nevertheless, while some of the legal arguments (such as being invited by the legitimate government of South Sudan) can be asserted, others are clearly dubious. In addition, the participation of Ugandan troops in the fighting on the side of the Kiir government renders the intervention illegal.     

Optimal defence structure for a small country

Small countries may not be able to afford all force elements (army, navy, air-force) operated by larger countries and certainly cannot afford all sub-elements (aircraft carriers, submarines, etc). This paper provides a framework for a small country to analyse its force structure, examining the influence of objectives, international co-operation, funding and technological constraints, and uncertainty. We analyse when a small country may choose to retain a balanced structure (with each force element) and when it may choose to drop one or more elements. The issues are illustrated with the decision by the New Zealand government over whether to retain a strike aircraft capacity.     

Airpower in India's 1999 Kargil War

For 74 days in mid-1999, India waged an intense war against intruding Pakistani forces on the Indian side of the Line of Control dividing Kashmir in the Himalayas. The Indian Air Force (IAF) was a key contributor to India's eventual victory in that war. Among other things, the IAF's combat performance showed how the skillful application of air-delivered firepower, especially if unmatched by the other side, can shorten and facilitate the outcome of an engagement that might otherwise have persisted indefinitely. It also showed that a favorable position in the conventional balance remains strategically useful even in conditions of mutual nuclear deterrence.     

Cyber War Will Take Place!

The question of whether or not cyber war amounts to war per se is difficult to determine given strategic theory's uncertain grasp of the concepts of force, violence and lethality. These three concepts, along with their relationships with one another, are explored in order to demonstrate that cyber attacks can in fact be construed as acts of war.     

Insurgency by the numbers I: A reconsideration of the ecology of communist success in jiangxi province,China

Theorizing about Taliban operations in Afghanistan has its limits and it is possible that Kabul-centric strategies do not adequately address the unique circumstances of each region in the country. How exactly has the Taliban gone about attaining its objectives in Kandahar province and how have those approaches evolved since 2002? And how have the Taliban adapted to coalition forces' attempts to compete with the insurgency and stamp it out? The answers to these questions are critical in the formulation of any counterinsurgency approach to Afghanistan.     

How might Democratisation Affect Military Professionalism in Africa? Reviewing the Literature

The search continues for methods to improve security for development in Sub-Saharan Africa. One of the important actors in this security arena is Sub-Saharan African governments’ armies. Much of their capability to meet security challenge depends on how militarily professional they are. The wave of democratic evolution in Africa since 1990 also affected military professionalism. This article reviews three models for assessing how democratisation might affect military professionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa, with special attention to post-conflict states. This should make it possible to decide which analytical methods are most appropriate to measure military professionalism in the particular circumstances of Sub-Saharan African post-conflict democratisation. Depending upon the particular nation-state in question, this decision on analytical methods may be useful for other Sub-Saharan states as well.     

《人民武装警察法》中“协助”之分析

在最新颁布实施的《中华人民共和国人民武装警察法》中，共有3条6处规定了武警部队在执行国内安全保卫任务时对其他机关的“协助”，但是这些协助性任务的性质并不是很明确。本文通过对行政协助构成关键点的剖析，探究该法律中的“协助”是否是真正意义上的行政协助。     

浅谈武警部队财务信息化建设

结合笔者工作实践，对武警部队实施财务信息化管理的现状和问题进行了简要归纳和总结，并着重对武警部队如何顺利推进财务管理信息化提出了建议和意见。     

新疆边境地区反恐情报保障问题研究

反恐情报保障是反恐行动的重要组成部分和决策依据。针对新疆边境地区情报力量建设较弱、情报保障手段单一、与有关部门缺乏有效的交流机制等问题，公安边防部门应采取加强情报力量建设、完善情报保障机制、充分利用各种情报手段和加强情报交流与合作等有效措施，不断提高反恐情报保障能力，掌握反恐怖斗争的主动权。     

把握武警部队初级任职教育院校特点提升学科方向建设水平

武警初级任职教育教学特点决定着学科方向建设和发展。而学科方向对学科建设具有决定性的推动作用。武警部队初级任职教育院校要针对影响学科方向的问题，结合武警部队需要和院校建设特点，搞好学科方向建设。